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Abstract Contest success functions, which show how probabilities of win-
ning depend on resources devoted to a conict, have been widely used in the
literature addressing appropriative activities (economics), international and
civil wars (political science), and group conict and selection (evolutionary
biology). Two well-known forms of contest success functions predict contest
outcomes from the di¤erence between the resources of each side and from the
ratio of resources. The analytical properties of a given conict model, such
as the existence of equilibrium, can be drastically changed simply by altering
the form of the contest success function. Despite this problem, there is no
consensus about which form is analytically better or empirically more plausi-
ble. In this paper we propose an integrated form of contest success functions,
which has the ratio form and the di¤erence form as limiting cases, and study
the analytical properties of this function. We also estimate di¤erent contest
success functions to see which form is more empirically probable, using data
from battles fought in seventeenth-century Europe and during World War II.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally scholars treated conict as a pathological state requiring spe-
cial treatment. However, in recent years, various theories of conict have found
important applications in and made contributions to elds such as economics,
political science, and evolutionary biology. Economists have examined as-
pects and implications of appropriative activities, such as rent-seeking behav-
iors, and the trade-o¤ between appropriation and production when property
rights are not well-dened (Tullock, 1967, 1980; Hirshleifer, 1991; Grossman,
1994). Political scientists, focusing on political turmoil such as war, civil war,
and demonstration, have scrutinized the cause of these conict situations and
their implications (Fearon, 1995; Collier and Hoe­ er, 2001; Sambanis, 2004;
Kalyvas et al., 2008). More importantly, early human lethal conict is being
recognized as a key factor in explaining human cooperation in evolutionary
biology (Bowles, 2008; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Garcia and Bergh, 2008).
In these studies the technology of conict is usually described by a function
called the contest success function. A contest is a game in which participants
expend resources on arming so as to increase their probability of winning
if conict were to actually take place (Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2006, p.1)
and contest success functions show how probabilities of winning depend on
the resources devoted to conict. Two well-known forms of contest success
functions predict contest outcomes from the di¤erence between the resources
of each side and from the ratio of resources.
In spite of the frequent use of the two di¤erent forms of contest success func-
tions, there is no agreement on which form better represents the technology
of conict. Jack Hirshleifer points out that the ratio form has the impractical
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implication that a side investing zero e¤ort loses everything as long as the
opponents spend a small amount of resources (Hirshleifer, 1989, 1991). How-
ever, since the di¤erence form does not admit the existence of an interior pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in widely used conict models, the ratio form is
more commonly used.
In this paper we present an integrated form of contest success functions,
which has the ratio form and the di¤erence form as limiting cases, and study
the analytical properties of this form. We also estimate di¤erent contest suc-
cess functions using war data, which provide a natural candidate for a variable
that measures e¤ort or resources, namely the number of combatants.
To compare these two common functions we consider the following example.
For concreteness we use the language of military combat, following Hirshleifer
(1991). Suppose p is the winning probability of side 1 when two ghters
of side 1 face one ghter of side 2   a situation that we denote by (2; 1):
We ask the following question: when a thousand and one ghters of side 1
contend with a thousand ghters of side 2, namely (1001; 1000), should we
still assign the same value of p to the winning probability of side 1? Similarly,
if the number of ghters of side 1 and side 2 are 2000 and 1000 respectively,
(2000; 1000), would p be the correct probability of side 1s winning? One may
argue that because the importance of one more ghter becomes smaller as
the total number of ghters grows, we should assign a probability less than
p to (1001; 1000): Regarding the case (2000; 1000); one may think that the
e¤ectiveness of ghting ability may increase faster as ghter size increases, so
side 1 can have a higher probability of winning in (2000; 1000) (see Lanchester,
1916).
The problem is that in analysis one necessarily chooses one specic form of
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contest success functions, thus adopting one interpretation of these functions,
even though we do not have a good answer to the above questions. The main
purpose of this paper is to dene a new contest success function which provides
more exibility in specication than the existing forms. Section 2 provides the
derivation, which closely resembles that of a CES production function (Arrow
et al., 1961). The probabilistic derivation, like McFaddens (1974) and Jias
(2008), is also provided. We examine the existence of a pure strategy interior
Nash equilibrium. In section 3 we present the empirical estimation of various
contest success functions using battle data of seventeenth-century Europe and
World War II and section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Integrated Form
2.1 Derivation
Denoting the resources or ghting e¤ort devoted to a contest by side 1 and
side 2 by x1 and x2 respectively and winning probabilities of side 1 and side
2 by u(x1; x2) and v(x1; x2); we have the di¤erence form and the ratio form of
contest success functions (Hirshleifer, 1989):
Di¤erence : ud(x1; x2) =
exp (x1)
exp (x1) + exp (x2)
for 0  x1; x2
vd(x1; x2) =
exp (x2)
exp (x1) + exp (x2)
for 0  x1; x2
4
Ratio : ur(x1; x2) =
8><>:
(x1)

(x1)
+(x2)
 if 0 < x1 or 0 < x2
1
2
if x1 = 0 and x2 = 0
vr(x1; x2) =
8><>:
(x2)

(x1)
+(x2)
 if 0 < x1 or 0 < x2
1
2
if x1 = 0 and x2 = 0
The superscript, d or r, indicates the di¤erence or the ratio form. Clearly
the di¤erence form gives the winning probabilities based on the di¤erence
between resources, x1 x2 , since ud(x1; x2) = 11+exp( (x1 x2)) , while the prob-
ability of winning in the ratio form depends only on the ratio, x1=x2; because
ur(x1; x2) =
1
1+(x2=x1)
 . We also note that the ratio form of contest success
functions is not continuous at (0; 0); which accounts for the impossibility of
(0; 0)s being a Nash equilibrium in a conict model. We will discuss this more
precisely in section 2.2.
Note that in the example given in the introduction, the ratio of the increase
in ghters of side 1 to the corresponding increase in side 2, necessary to keep
the probability of winning constant, captures the degree of overvaluing (or
undervaluing) the probability of winning. Specically we compute
case 1: ratio of increases in ghters =
1001  2
1000  1  1 (1)
case 2: ratio of increases in ghters =
2000  2
1000  1  2 (2)
Motivated by this, we dene a new rate which can serve as a measure
comparing two forms of contest success functions and call this the marginal
rate of augmentation (MRA). This measure shows the quantity of additional
resources side 1 needs to augment its existing resources to keep the probability
of winning constant against an increase in the other sides resources. More
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precisely if we consider the level set of side 1s contest success function u =
u(x1; x2) and use the notation x2 = x2(x1) such that u = u(x1; x2(x1)); MRA
is the slope of x2(x1):
MRA :=
dx2
dx1
=  ux1
ux2
where ux1 = @u=@x1; ux2 = @u=@x2: So if MRA is high more resources should
be devoted to obtain the same probability of success. Using MRA we now
dene an elasticity of augmentation as follows:
elasticity of augmentation ()
=
percentage increase in MRA
percentage increase in relative size of contestantsresources
=
d ln( ux1=ux2)
d ln(x2=x1)
The elasticity of augmentation is a normalized percentage increase in MRA
and since u+v = 1, we can also write  = d ln(vx1=ux2 )
d ln(x2=x1)
:When  is low, we expect
that side 1 would need to augment its resources by a smaller amount to keep
up the same probability of success. This may correspond to the situation
described by the di¤erence form. By contrast, a high  implies that side 1
should extend its resources by greater amounts to gain the same probability
of success. This situation is possibly captured by the ratio form. By simple
calculation we verify that for the di¤erence form the elasticity of augmentation
is 0, whereas for the ratio form the elasticity is 1.
The parameter  in the two forms is a mass e¤ect parameter scaling
the decisiveness of ghting e¤ort disparities(Hirshleifer, 1991) and measures
the slope of the contest success function in an evenly balanced match   the
contest where x1 = x2. By computing the marginal probabilities of winning in
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an evenly balanced match,
@ud
@x1
=

4
;
@ur
@x1
=

4

x1
and we see that @ud=@x1 = @ur=@x1 = 4 if x1 = x2 = 1: Since we would
like to nd an interpolation between the di¤erence form and the ratio form
with a constant elasticity of augmentation we require this probability to equal

4
at x1 = 1 for a newly derived function. With these parameters, we have
proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Suppose we have the following equations:
d ln( ux1=ux2)
d ln(x2=x1)
=  for x1; x2  0 (3)
ux1(x1; x2) =

4
for x1 = x2 = 1 (4)
u(x1; x2; ) =
f(x1)
f(x1) + f(x2)
(5)
where 0  ;  6= 1;  > 0 and f(0) > 0; f is increasing and di¤erentiable
for x1; x2  0: Then equation (6) is a unique solution satisfying (3), (4), and
(5)
u(x1; x2; ) =
exp

 1
1 x
1 
1

exp

 1
1 x
1 
1

+ exp

 1
1 x
1 
2
 for 0   < 1 (6)
Moreover we have
u(x1; x2; 0) = u
d(x1; x2) and u(x1; x2; )! ur(x1; x2) as ! 1 (7)
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Proof. By rearranging (3) we obtain
(x1)
ux1 + c(x2)
ux2 = 0 for some c 6= 0 (8)
Using (5) and (8) we nd
(x1)
f 0(x1)f(x2)  c(x2)f(x1)f 0(x2) = 0 for x1; x2  0 (9)
By evaluating (9) at x1 = x2 > 0 we conclude c = 1: We set x2 = 1 in (9) and
nd
f 0(x1)
f(x1)
=
f 0(1)
f(1)
1
x1
(10)
and using (4) and (5) we see that f 0(1)=f(1) = . Then by solving (10) we
obtain
u(x1; x2; ) =
exp( 1
1 x
1 
1 )
exp( 1
1 x
1 
1 ) + exp(
1
1 x
1 
2 )
So we have u(x1; x2; 0) = ud(x1; x2) and the fact that u(x1; x2; )! ur(x1; x2)
as ! 1 follows from an application of LHopitals rule.
We call u(x1; x2; ) in (6) an integrated form of contest success function
and write u(x1; x2) := u(x1; x2; ). According to proposition 1 an integrated
contest success function equals the di¤erence form when  = 0 and approaches
the ratio form as ! 1: Skaperdas (1996) shows that a function of the form (5)
satises the desirable axioms of contest success functions, where the desirable
axioms include monotonicity, anonymity, and independence from irrelevant
alternatives (See Skaperdas, 1996, pp.284-286). Hence by proposition 1 we
also conclude that the integrated form is a unique function which satises the
properties of (3, 4) and the desirable properties of a contest success function,
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Figure 1: Comparison of contest success functions. Each line shows the
combinations of x1 and x2 where side 1s probability of winning is 0.4. We use the values,
 = 1;  = 0:3
and this provides an axiomatic characterization of the new integrated form.
Figure 1 depicts the level sets of the integrated form, the di¤erence form, and
the ratio form. As we expect the integrated form describes the intermediate
level of probabilities between the di¤erence form and the ratio form.
Next we consider the probabilistic derivation of the integrated form. We
write X  F (s) to indicate that the distribution of a random variable, X; is
F (s); and recall X follows Gumbel type (type I) extreme value distribution
if X  exp( e s) and Fréchet type (type II) extreme value distribution if
X  exp( s ) for s  0; where  is a positive constant. We suppose the
result of a contest depends on performance, hi ; and performance is in turn
determined by xi and a random factor i: i.e. hi = hi(xi; i) (Garnkel and
Skaperdas, 2006).
If the specication of performance is in additive form, hdi = xi + i, and i
follows a Gumbel type distribution, the di¤erence form of the contest success
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function equals Prfhd1 > hd2g (McFadden, 1974). When i follows a Fréchet
type distribution and the specication of performance is in multiplicative form,
hri = xii; the ratio form of the contest success function can be derived from
Pr fhr1 > hr2g (Jia, 2008). We set hi() := x
1 
i  1
1  +
1 i  1
1  and easily see that
Prfh1(0) > h2(0)g = Prfhd1 > hd2g and Prfh1(1) > h2(1)g = Prfhr1 > hr2g;
where we use notations hi(1) = lim!1 hi():
Since we have Prfx1 + 1 < x2 + 2g = Prf1   2 < x2   x1g for given
x1 and x2; McFadden (1974)s result is obtained by showing that 1   2 
1
1+e s for i  exp( e s). Similarly because Prfx11 < x22g = Prflog 1  
log 2 < log x2   log x1g holds, Jias derivation is equivalent to showing that
log 1   log 2  11+e s for i  exp( s ) for s  0: Proposition 2 provides
the generalization of these derivations. In the proposition we use the following
denition of the rational power of real numbers, s
n
m : form;n natural numbers
s
n
m :=
8><>: (
m
p
s)n if s  0
 ( mp s)n if s < 0
(11)
where m
p
s; for s > 0, denotes a unique positive real number y such that ym = s:
Proposition 2 Suppose that  = 1  n
m
; m; n are natural numbers such that
m > n and 1; 2  F (s) i.i.d. and F (s) = exp

 e  11  s1 

for  1 < s <
1 and hi() := x
1 
i  1
1  +
1 i  1
1  : Then
Prfh1() > h2()g =
exp

 1
1 x
1 
1

exp

 1
1 x
1 
1

+ exp

 1
1 x
1 
2

Proof. From (11) we see that 1
1 s
1  is continuous, increasing and 1
1 s
1  !
 1 as s !  1 and 1
1 s
1  ! 1 as s ! 1; so F (s) is indeed a
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distribution function. Since Prfh1() > h2()g = Prf 11 x1 1   11 x1 2 >
1
1 
1 
2   11 1 1 g; in the view of McFadden (1974) (or lemma in the appen-
dix) it is enough to show that 1
1 
1 
1  exp( e s): Again from (11) and
the denition of F (s) we have
Prf 1
1  
1 
1 < sg = Prf1 <
 n
m
s
m
n g
= exp( e s)
We note that the distribution function F (s) does not possess a continuous
density since F (s) is not di¤erentiable at 0: Moreover if i  Fi(s) indepen-
dently and Fi(s) = exp

 ie 
1
1  s
1 
, from lemma 1 in the appendix we
have
Prfh1 > h2g =
1 exp

 1
1 x
1 
1

1 exp

 1
1 x
1 
1

+ 2 exp

 1
1 x
1 
2
 (12)
As !1; (12) approaches a generalized ratio form (Garnkel and Skaperdas,
2006) and 1 represents the relative ghting e¤ectiveness of side 1 against side
2 (see Dupuy, 1987; Kalyvas et al., 2008).
2.2 Existence of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Despite the fact that both the ratio form and the di¤erence form have
their respective analytical advantages, the ratio form is more commonly used
since it admits an interior pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for frequently-used
conict models (Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2006). We study the conditions for
 which allows a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, using a simple conict model
(Hirshleifer, 1989; Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2006). Assume side 1 and side 2
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have resources x1 and x2, where x1; x2 2 [0; x] and x  1; and they compete
for a prize of the value 2x, the sum of total available resources: The costs
of competing are the resources devoted to the contest, so we write expected
payo¤s for side 1 and side 2:
1(x1; x2) = 2x u (x1; x2)  x1 (13)
2(x1; x2) = 2x v(x1; x2)  x2 (14)
where 0   < 1: In the model with u being replaced by the ratio form ur in
(13) and (14), (x1; x0) = (0; 0) cannot be a Nash equilibrium since an arbitrary
small increase in resources from 0 will raise the probability of winning from 0.5
to 1 and hence the marginal probability of winning at 0 is innity (Hirshleifer,
1989). This is one of the main reasons why Hirshliefer criticizes the ratio form:
peace is never observed as an equilibrium outcome (Hirshleifer, 1991, p.132).
We look for a symmetric interior pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Denoting
such an equilibrium by (x1; x

2); we nd the rst order condition for the best
response of side 1, xBR1 , given x2:
2x
1
(xBR1 )

u(x
BR
1 ; x2)(1  u(xBR1 ; x2))  1 = 0 (15)
At a symmetric equilibrium, u(xBR1 ; x2) =
1
2
: Had we used the di¤erence form
instead of the integrated form or set  = 0, the left hand side of (15) would
not have depended on x1: Because of this an interior symmetric equilibrium
generally fails to exist in the di¤erence form, and this accounts for the more
popular use of the ratio form in conict models.
12
In the integrated form, if a symmetric equilibrium (x1; x

2) exists, from (15)
x1 = x

2 =
x
2
 1

(16)
To simplify the analysis we assume x < 2 and 00(t) < 0 for t 2 [0; x]
where (t) := 2x u (t; x2)   t: The rst assumption, x < 2; guarantees
x1 =
 
x
2
 1
 < x
2
< x and the second one ensures that (t) achieves a global
maximum at x1. With these two assumptions x

1 = x

2 =
 
x
2
 1
 is indeed
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium and we view x1 = x

2 =
 
x
2
 1
 as a
generalization of the solution in the case of the ratio form (For example, see
equation (10) in Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2006).
Moreover we verify that lim!0 x1 = 0; in the limiting case approaching
the di¤erence form, an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium converges to
0 and this shows one instance where there is no interior pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the di¤erence form. We conclude that under reasonable condi-
tions the integrated form of the contest success function allows an interior pure
strategy Nash equilibria for all 0   < 1: In gure 2 we present a numerical
example of this analysis.
3 Empirical Evidence
Since we do not have an a priori answer as to which form of the contest
success function is more plausible, we conduct an empirical analysis. As arms
races and wars are the most important and obvious examples of conictual
contest (See Konrad, 2007, for various forms of conict), we believe that the
estimation of contest success functions using war data would provide mean-
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Figure 2: Existence of an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We draw side 1s best response (thick line), side 2s best response (dashed line), side 1s
indi¤erence curves (thin line) in each panel. We use values,  = 1; x = 1. From the shape
of indi¤erence curves we see that 00(t) < 0 for all t:
ingful estimates of the parameters,  and .
3.1 Estimation Method
We use battle data from seventeenth century European wars in Bodart
(1908, pp. 49-177) and from World War II in Dupuy (1987, pp. 293-295).
Military combat, a violent, planned form of physical interaction between two
hostile opponents, has a natural hierarchy: war, campaign, battle, engagement,
and duel (Dupuy, 1987). Among these we consider two levels of military
combat: war and battle. A war is an armed conict or a state of belligerence
usually lasting for months or years, while a battle involves combat between
two armies with specic missions, normally lasting one or two days. The
seventeenth century European wars data cover 315 battles with each battle
corresponding to one observation in our data. Each observation has a record
of the winner, the loser, and the total number of personnel in winning and
14
losing armies.
We observe that each battle gives two pieces of information: the winning
probability of a winner and the losing probability of a loser. Because of this
di¢ culty in interpretation, we consider two constructions of data sets from
the original battle data. In the rst construction   the case presented in
the text   we associate each battle with either a winning event or a losing
event depending on a random draw. Alternatively, we expand the original
battle data such that each battle represents both winning and losing events
to each battle, hence obtaining a new data set with 630 observations. In this
case, presented in the appendix, we correct the standard errors by clustering
battles. We provide descriptive statistics for European battles in the appendix.
Denoting the indicator of winning by yi we use the following econometric
model:
yi  Bernoulli(i) (17)
(D) i = F ((x1i   x2i) + 1 + 2Darmy i + 3Dwar i)
(R) i = F ((lnx1i   lnx2i) + 1 + 2Darmy i + 3Dwar i)
(I) i = F ((x
1 
1i   x1 2i ) + 1 + 2Darmy i + 3Dwar i)
where F (s) = 1
1+e s ; Darmy, Dwar are dummy variables indicating the identity
of armies and the kind of wars (see appendix).
The specications of the models in equation (17) are the direct consequence
of proposition 2 and the dummy variables control for combat e¤ectiveness due
to the identity of armies or the specicity of wars. Indeed using F (s) and
15
 = 
1  we can write model (I) as
i =
exp1+2Darmy i+3Dwar i exp( 1
1 x
1 
1i )
exp1+2Darmy i+3Dwar i exp( 1
1 x
1 
1i ) + exp(
1
1 x
1 
2i )
so we can regard the part exp1+2Darmy i+3Dwar i as a ratio of is;
1
2
; in (12).
We also note that model (D) is a standard logit regression and model (R) is a
logit regression with the data log-transformed. Model (D), (R), and (I) esti-
mate the di¤erence form, the ratio form, and the integrated form, respectively.
We estimate each parameter using the maximum likelihood method, which is
the standard method in estimating logit models. We could not estimate the
di¤erence form and the integrated form in the case of the World War II data
since the data provides only the ratio of combat powers.
3.2 Estimation Results
In table 1 we note that all estimates of  in the di¤erence and the ratio
forms are positive, which shows that one sides winning probability is an in-
creasing function of that sides own e¤ort. For the integrated form we can
recover the implied  = 2:28009; using the relation  = (1  ).
To compare s in each model we compute one sides marginal probability
of winning at an evenly balanced match when the number of combatants is half
of its total available resources; i.e. if we denote the total available resources
by x, this marginal probability of winning is 1
4

(x=2)
. Since the mean number
of combatants in the seventeenth century European war data is 21,035 (see
appendix), we can use this number as a proxy for x
2
. Table 2 shows the
marginal probabilities of winning in an evenly balanced match.
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17C European War World War II
Di¤erence Ratio Integrated Ratio
 1:98 10 5 0:70377 3.41982
(9:32 10 6) (0:120365) (0.6776)
  18:19199
(6:4571)
 1:125335
(0:21571)
Number of 315 315 315 188
Observations
Percentage of 65:40 67:62 67:30 84.04
Correctly Predicted
Log-likelihood Value  200:8481  188:23251  188:0628  70:6855
Table 1: Estimation of contest success functions. All estimates are sig-
nicant at the 99% level. We use dummy variables of armies and wars in
the European war estimation and dummy variables of armies indicating either
Allied forces or German forces in the World War II data. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
We may interpret these numbers as follows: in response to an increase
of 10,000 in the number of combatants (from 21,035 original combatants),
the di¤erence form, the ratio form, and integrated form predict increases in
winning probabilities by 4.95%, 8.36%, 7.78%, respectively. In the case of
World War II, using the fact that the average strength of battles is around
14,000 (Dupuy, 1987, pp. 169) we compute a marginal probability of winning
104 as 2.4472 (or 244.72%) which is much larger than those of the European
wars. This fact suggests that the contest success function for World War II
is more non-linear than the one for the seventeenth century European wars
and the tremendous advantage of being even just a little stronger than ones
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D R I
marginal winning probability 104 0.0495 0.08364 0.077827
Table 2: Estimates of the mass e¤ect parameter
opponent, which is pointed out as one of the stylized facts of warfare by
Hirshleifer (1991, p 131), only appears in World War II data.
Which form of contest success functions better describes battle? As we
see in Table 1 and the appendix, estimates of  are close to 1. Our tentative
conclusion would be that a contest success function close to the ratio form
would best describe the probabilities of winning in battles. Of course the
peculiarity of 17th century European wars or other possible data problems
may have hindered the correct estimation of our model. This problem, if it
exists, can be corrected by extending data sets to cover other kinds of wars.
4 Discussion
In the paper we have proposed an integrated contest success function which
has the di¤erence form and the ratio form as limiting cases. Also we have
derived this new form axiomatically and provided a probabilistic derivation.
These results provide a generalization of the existing results. In addition we
have shown that the integrated form has desirable analytical properties which
admit an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Regarding the question of
the empirical plausibility of contest success functions, a tentative conclusion
is that the ratio form of contest success functions square with seventeenth
century European wars.
Another way of interpreting the integrated contest success function is
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through the transformation of variables. Since we do not know the exact unit
of measurement for ghting e¤ort or resources in various conict situations, we
may interpret the problem of choosing contest success functions as a problem
of choosing a transformation method   the transformation of observed vari-
ables into variables with correct measurement. In this interpretation, as we
have seen in the text, the di¤erence form with the log transformation corre-
sponds to the ratio form. More generally, the integrated form of contest success
functions arises from the di¤erence form with a transformation Xi = xi 11  .
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Appendix: Lemma and Tables
First we prove the lemma used in the text.
Lemma 1 Suppose that for i = 1; 2, i  exp( ie s) independently where
i > 0;  > 0 and  1 < s <1: Then 1   2  11+2e s :
Proof. It is easy to check (s) := 1
1+2e
 s is a distribution function. From
the denition of i, we have Prf2 2 dsg = exp( 2e s)2 exp( s)ds.
Hence from the denition of conditional probability and the independence
between 1 and 2; we have
Prf1 < 2 + xg =
Z 1
 1
Prf1 < s+ xgPrf2 2 dsg
=
Z 1
 1
exp( 1e s x) exp( 2e s)2 exp( s)ds
=
Z 1
0
exp( t(1e x + 2))2dt
=
2
1e
 x + 2
(18)
We use the change of variable; t = exp( s); in the third line and the asserted
claim follows from (18)
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We provide tables containing descriptive statistics and alternative estima-
tions.
War Number of Battles
War of the Spanish Succession 108
Thirty YearsWar 64
Austro-Turkish War 34
Great Northern War 29
Dutch War 19
War of the League of Augsburg 18
Other wars 43
Table A1: 17th century European wars. Other wars include wars with less
than ten battles. These are the Turkish War with Venice and Austria, English Civil War,
Hungarian-Turkish War, Polish-Turkish War, Second English Civil War, The Fronde, War
of the Quadruple Alliance, Polish-Swedish War, Spanish-Portuguese War, Swedish-Danish
War, The First Northern War, War of Devolution, Chamber of Reunion, English Scottish
War, Franco-Spanish War, Moldavian Campaign, Monmoths Rebellion, Polish Insurgency,
and Turkish-Ventian War. The classication of war is based on Dupuy and Dupuy (1986)
and Palmer and Colton (1984).
Statistics Number of Personnel
Number of observations 630
Mean 21035
Maximum 260000
Minimum 1000
Standard Deviation 24047
Median 15000
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for number of personnel involved in
17th century European war.
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Statistics Combat Power Ratio
Number of observations 188
Mean 1.4332
Maximum 7.54
Minimum 0.1326
Standard Deviation 1.30212
Median 1
Table A3: Descriptive statistics for combat power ratio in World
War II data.
17C European War
Di¤erence Ratio Integrated
 2:24 10 5 0:803
(9:30 10 6) (0:133)
  20:478
(5:159)
 1:117
(0:214)
Number of 630 630 630
Observations
Percentage of 70:63 73:97 73:73
Correctly Predicted
Log-likelihood Value  382:443  354:87  354:552
Table A4: Alternative data set. Each battle represents both a winning event
and a losing event. The standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and clustering.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
  2505:666  19:123  20:099  49:866
(226:199) (7:736) (19:510) (93:992)
Implied  0:749194 2:52424 3:739 13:9193
 1:0003 1:132 1:186 1:279
(0:0000299) (0:204) (0:242) (0:340)
Number of Observation 308 315 315 184
Log-likelihood Value  182:557  185:612  192:636  95:279
Table A5: Alternative estimation. Model 1: Excludes observations with armies
of size greater than 100,000; Model 2: Some observations indicate that the battle took
place in a garrison. We use the dummy variable when the observation has this indication;
Model 3: Excludes dummy variables for wars; Model 4: Includes only battles among eight
major armies: French, Imperial, Swedish, Spanish, Turkish, English, Dutch, Russian. The
standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering.
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